This page reproduces proposal text and published results preserved from Snapshot. It reflects the archive capture below.
Archive capture completed:
Published voting information
State at capture
closed
Voting type
basic
Created
2024-08-08 10:33:25 UTC
Voting opened
2024-08-08 10:33:24 UTC
Voting closed
2024-08-22 10:33:24 UTC
Snapshot block
20483289
Participation score
22513.103241400593
Published quorum
14337
Quorum type
default
Recorded ballots
135
Published choice scores
Choice
Score
For
21952.580458907018
Against
560.5227824935705
Abstain
0
Preserved proposal text
Original text, including Markdown notation. Linked content is not reproduced here.
RPIP-58 introduces a limit on the total number of MEV penalties that the oDAO can apply to minipools in one week.
## Outcome If Vote Passes
The pDAO asks the development team to include RPIP-58 in the next major smart contract release.
## Rationale
Currently, the oDAO can apply an unlimited number of penalties without any delay. This exposes node operators to unnecessary risk. In the worst case, a compromised oDAO can penalize 100% of the ETH that node operators have in minipools. For legitimate use of the penalty system, this is overpowered. This proposal aims to reduce oDAO trust by introducing a sensible limit that doesn’t interfere with legitimate use of the penalty system and minimizes impact from illegitimate use.
## Context
- [RPIP-58](https://rpips.rocketpool.net/RPIPs/RPIP-58)
- [RPIP-58 Discussion Thread](https://dao.rocketpool.net/t/rpip-58-mev-penalty-guardrail/3009)
- [RPIP-58 Discussion Thread - Sentiment Poll](https://dao.rocketpool.net/t/rpip-58-mev-penalty-guardrail/3009/5)